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of Pre-WWII Dynamics and Contemporary
Geopolitics

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Echoes of the 1930sA Scientific Comparative Analysis of Pre-WWII Dynamics and Contemporary Geopolitics

Roland Brandtjen

ABSTRACT:

This paper compares the inter-war 1930s with the post-2014 international system to identify structural continuities that threaten contemporary stability. A tri-layer literature review integrates archival records, modern governmental datasets and global opinion surveys, normalising disparate time-series for direct cross-epoch comparison. Four recurring fault lines emerge: expansionist revisionism, democratic backsliding, intergenerational economic strain and multilateral erosion. Case comparisons—Germany-Austria 1938 vs. Russia-Crimea 2014; League of Nations budget collapse vs. today’s UN funding crisis—demonstrate how weak enforcement and fiscal shortfalls embolden aggressors and extremist movements. Quantitative indicators show youth incomes 13% below parental cohorts across the OECD and UN humanitarian appeals funded at only 13%, echoing Great-Depression-era precarity and institutional paralysis. Yet divergences—nuclear deterrence, digital mobilisation and global value-chain interdependence—moderate direct analogies, constraining full-scale war while amplifying ideological contagion. Early-warning thresholds for expansionism, democratic erosion, economic discontent and multilateral under-funding are proposed to guide automatic policy responses. Recognising both historical rhymes and contemporary differences is essential to forestall a reprise of the 1930s’ systemic collapse.

KEYWORDS:

Comparative politics, Democratic backsliding, Territorial revisionism, Multilateral institutions, Historical institutionalism

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Prof. Dr Roland Brandtjen is professor at IU international University GmbH. As a European Studies scholar, his expertise lies in collective identities and their influence on politics. His focus is on the European integration process of regions of Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the UK, as well as all recognised micronations of Europe in relation to the concept of independence. He has studied and worked in Europe at home and abroad. He completed his doctorate at the RWTH in Aachen.

Introduction

Over the past decade, numerous analysts have argued that the twenty-first-century international order increasingly “rhymes” with the inter-war years. The present paper deploys a rigorous literature-review methodology to compare the geopolitical, socio-economic, and institutional dynamics of the inter-war 1930s with developments since 2014. Drawing on archival sources, contemporary governmental datasets, and large-scale opinion surveys, the analysis identifies four recurring fault lines—expansionist revisionism, democratic backsliding, intergenerational economic strain, and multilateral erosion—and situates them within a coherent historical framework. By normalizing disparate time-series, coding qualitative themes such as “revisionist demand,” and constructing cross-epoch comparison tables, the research demonstrates how territorial irredentism, mass-appeal nationalism, and institutional paralysis re-emerge when enforcement mechanisms weaken and economic insecurity rises. At the same time, the study acknowledges transformative divergences—nuclear deterrence, digital mobilisation, and global value-chain interdependence—that differentiate the contemporary landscape from its 1930s antecedent. It outlines the analytical scope, evidentiary foundations, and interpretive goals of the work: to illuminate structural continuities, highlight novel constraints, and furnish policymakers with empirically grounded early-warning indicators capable of averting a reprise of history’s most destructive spiral.

Methodology and Data Sources

A theoretical approach based on a comprehensive literature review underpins this study’s comparative analysis of historic and contemporary international dynamics. (De Marco, 2025) Relying on scholarly publications, archival documents, policy reports, and digital repositories such as JSTOR, Scopus, Google Scholar, and institutional databases from OECD, UN, NATO, and the Council of Europe, this method provides a robust evidence base for identifying structural patterns spanning from the interwar period (1918–1939) to the present. The review covers three layers: historical archival material (such as League of Nations records and interwar economic statistics), up-to-date governmental and organizational datasets (covering housing, income, defense expenditure, and humanitarian funding), and primary survey data from sources like Gallup and Pew Research Center.

All data underwent normalization, for example, constant-currency adjustment and per-capita conversion—to allow direct comparison. Qualitative information, including themes like “revisionist demand” or “anti-multilateral rhetoric,” was coded for structured cross-tabling. This ensures both transparency and replicability, reinforcing analytical reliability.

The literature review method offers significant strengths. Its core advantage is the ability to synthesize widespread knowledge, allowing researchers to observe long-term trends and thematic continuities, such as repeated institutional challenges from the League of Nations to the United Nations, or recurring youth economic difficulties linked to political shifts. It is also efficient, allowing broad coverage of research without the need for new data collection, and highlights knowledge gaps—stimulating further empirical inquiry. Comparative reviews encourage critical analysis by placing conflicting findings in context and nurturing theoretical innovation. (Dziuban, Picciano, Graham, & Moskal, 2015)

However, the literature review also has limitations. It relies entirely on already available data, risking omission of emerging or poorly documented phenomena. Publication bias can distort findings, as

studies with novel or significant results are overrepresented. The varying quality of sources may lead to uneven reliability, and broad or poorly defined review criteria can result in a loss of analytical focus. Importantly, because the literature review does not generate new primary data, it cannot resolve empirical questions where current evidence is lacking. (Williams, 2015)

In this study, the literature review supports a nuanced understanding of structural parallels and divergences across eras, from multilateral funding crises to the socioeconomic roots of political radicalization. By maintaining rigorous source selection, normalization practices, and transparent coding, the approach balances the strengths of broad synthesis with an awareness of its methodological limits. Overall, literature reviews remain indispensable for theoretically driven, multidisciplinary research—provided their results are interpreted with critical caution and methodological rigor. (Brancati, 2018)

Historical Baseline: the 1930s in Review

The 1930s marked a critical breakdown of the post-World War I international order as revisionist powers systematically exploited weak collective security mechanisms. Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria, Germany's 1938 annexation of Austria, and Italy's 1935 conquest of Abyssinia demonstrated how aggressive states could capitalize on institutional paralysis and democratic hesitation. Concurrent economic devastation from the Great Depression created domestic conditions enabling both authoritarian consolidation and weakened international cooperation, establishing patterns of escalating crisis that would culminate in global war.

GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE: THE DYNAMICS OF GREAT-POWER AGGRESSION IN THE 1930S

The interwar period was a crucible of escalating geopolitical crises, driven by revisionist powers dissatisfied with the post-World War I settlement. Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 stands out as a catalytic event that not only destabilized East Asia but also provided a practical demonstration of the weaknesses inherent in the collective security regime established by the League of Nations. (Culver, 2023) This operation, justified by the Mukden Incident—a staged act of sabotage on the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway—resulted in the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. (Fukurai & Yang, 2018) The League's inability to sanction Japan or reverse its territorial gains effectively demonstrated the impotence of international mechanisms designed to prevent aggression, encouraging other revisionist powers to test the limits of the status quo. (Townsend, 2009)

Germany's annexation (Anschluss) of Austria in 1938, followed by the seizure of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, further exemplified ethnonationalist expansion strategies. Adolf Hitler leveraged the rhetoric of protecting ethnic Germans and historical rights to rationalize these moves, which were facilitated by a combination of coercive diplomacy, orchestrated popular mobilization, and the reluctance of Western powers to intervene decisively. The Munich Agreement of 1938, which acceded to these territorial demands in the hope of preserving peace, is often cited as the quintessential failure of appeasement. These actions emboldened the Nazi regime and directly undermined the Versailles order. (Rodin, 2024; Press, 2004; Tlepina, 2025; Zander, 2018)

Italy's conquest of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 under Benito Mussolini similarly exposed the limitations of the League of Nations. Italy's aggressive use of modern weaponry, including chemical agents, against Ethiopian forces was widely condemned but encountered only partial and ineffective sanctions from the League. The episode dealt a fatal blow to the credibility of international institutions, further laying the groundwork for the unravelling of the collective security framework in Europe and beyond. The Abyssinian crisis also provided a precedent for fascist powers to disregard international law with relative impunity, reinforcing a climate of diplomatic opportunism among dissatisfied powers. (Aynalem, 2018; Wright, 2028; Paisley, 2017)

DOMESTIC POLITICS: ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

The onset of the Great Depression after the U.S. stock market crash of 1929 had profound and destabilizing socio-economic consequences across Europe. Mass unemployment, hyperinflation in some regions, collapsing trade volumes, and plummeting living standards created fertile ground for radical ideologies and political realignment. This period witnessed a dramatic polarization of electorates and the erosion of faith in liberal democracy, as centrist parties failed to cope with the mounting crises. (Spread, 2025)

In Germany, the National Socialist (Nazi) Party, initially a marginal movement, surged to prominence by exploiting economic discontent, nationalist resentment towards the Versailles Treaty, and persistent political instability. The Nazis became the largest party in the Reichstag by 1932, paving the way for Hitler's appointment as chancellor and the rapid dismantling of democratic institutions. Similar waves of radicalization unfolded in Italy, where Mussolini's Fascist movement had already seized power in the 1920s, and in Spain, where the polarization between left- and right-wing forces set the stage for civil war. Across Eastern Europe, authoritarian regimes gained ground as economic hardship discredited parliamentary politics and emboldened populist, nationalist, or outright authoritarian parties. This trend was reinforced by a widespread perception that only strong, decisive leadership could restore order and prosperity during a time of generalized crisis. (Fischer, 2019; Richter, Nithammer, & Mândru, 2025)

CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: KEY SHIFTS SINCE 2014

The echoes of interwar dynamics are discernible in twenty-first-century geopolitics, particularly following Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014. This marked the first occasion since 1945 that established European borders were altered by force—a dramatic breach of international norms underpinning the post-Cold War order. Russia's military annexation of Crimea was justified with claims of protecting ethnic Russians and rectifying historical injustices, mirroring the rhetoric used by Germany in the 1930s. The lack of an immediate or forceful international counter-response reinforced the perception of Western reluctance and tested the strength of contemporary international security guarantees. (Naumov & Senin, 2024; Pynnöniemi & Rącz, 2016)

The subsequent full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 escalated this challenge from a localized crisis to a full-blown continental confrontation, with profound consequences for European security, energy markets, and global diplomatic alignments. The ongoing conflict not only highlights the fragility of the current security order but also exemplifies the kind of territorial revisionism and ethno-

nationalist justification that defined the interwar period. The war has also generated the largest refugee flow in Europe since World War II and forced a rethinking of both NATO and European Union defence strategies. (Mankoff, 2022; Freedman, 2023)

In parallel, the period since 2014 has been marked by significant U.S. retrenchment from several aspects of international engagement. The United States has enacted substantial funding cuts to the United Nations, including UNESCO and UNRWA, and has repeatedly signalled ambivalence about the reliability of NATO's Article 5 defence guarantee in the face of allied under-spending or political differences. This policy drift has cast doubt on the future of collective security arrangements and contributed to uncertainties about the long-term viability of the transatlantic alliance. (Haug, Novoselova, & Klingebiel, 2025; Founta, Kollias, & Tzeremes, 2025)

Similarly, China's military preparations regarding Taiwan intensify each year, with the People's Liberation Army escalating military pressure by 300 percent in 2024 alone. U.S. Admiral Samuel Paparo characterized Chinese manoeuvres as "dress rehearsals for forced unification," noting that Beijing's exercises simulate maritime blockades and missile strikes against Taiwan. These preparations follow a deliberate three-phase operational plan: joint combat readiness patrols for troop assembly, strikes against sea and land targets to achieve battlefield dominance, and finally manoeuvres to intercept and detain ships bound for Taiwan. (Tan & Tan, 2025; Atlamazoglou, 2025; Lin, 2025)

The electoral success of far-right parties further echoes inter-war dynamics. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, far-right parties achieved historic gains across major European economies. (Shehzad Ali, 2021) As with the failures of the League of Nations in the 1930s, these developments raise pressing questions about the capacity of the current international order to deter aggression, uphold norms, and stabilize regions confronted with revisionist challenges.

Comparative Thematic Analysis

This comparative thematic analysis examines striking structural parallels between the interwar period of the 1930s and contemporary international relations since 2014. The study systematically analyses four critical domains: expansionist revisionism, democratic backsliding and extremist politics, economic stressors and intergenerational inequality, and the erosion of multilateral institutions. Through detailed comparison tables and empirical data, the analysis demonstrates how territorial irredentism, mass-appeal nationalism, institutional paralysis, and economic precarity create recurring patterns across historical periods. While acknowledging crucial differences such as nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, this framework reveals how contemporary geopolitical dynamics echo the dangerous precedents that preceded global catastrophe in the twentieth century, offering essential insights for understanding current international challenges.

1. EXPANSIONIST REVISIONISM

Expansionist revisionism, in the context of international relations, refers to a state's pursuit of territorial or political expansion while simultaneously seeking to revise the existing international order. It combines the desire to change the status quo with the ambition to expand a nation's power and influence. This can involve challenging established borders, seeking to dominate weaker nations, or

altering international norms and institutions to better suit the revisionist state's interests. (DiCicco & Sanchez, 2021; Chi, 2025)

Contemporary international relations witness the resurgence of territorial revisionism reminiscent of the 1930s. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked the first forcible border change in Europe since 1945, drawing immediate historical parallels to inter-war aggression. (Mankoff, 2022) The international response mirrored League of Nations failures, with condemnatory statements proving insufficient to reverse territorial gains. This established a precedent that emboldened further expansionist behaviour, culminating in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. (Pynnöniemi & Rácz, 2016; Kim L. , 2024)

China's preparations for a possible confrontation over Taiwan have intensified year after year, with the People's Liberation Army increasing its coercive activity by an estimated 300 percent in 2024. U.S. Admiral Samuel Paparo has described these drills as "dress rehearsals for forced unification," noting that they replicate maritime blockades and missile strikes on the island. The exercise cycle follows a clear three-stage sequence: initial joint combat-readiness patrols to mass forces, subsequent strikes on sea and land targets to secure operational dominance, and final interdiction manoeuvres aimed at intercepting and detaining vessels bound for Taiwan. (Tan & Tan, 2025; Atlamazoglou, 2025; Lin, 2025)

The comparative table in Figure 1 demonstrates a consistent pattern: states intent on revising borders rhetorically frame their actions as protective, restorative, or indispensable to national security. Modern parallels also highlight additional enablers absent in the 1930s—precision-guided missiles and nuclear umbrellas—which lower the perceived cost of incremental encroachment.

| HISTORICAL CASE (1930S) | TRIGGER & MODERN PARALLEL (2014-2025) | TRIGGER & JUSTIFICATION | TRIGGER & JUSTIFICATION |
|---|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| GERMANY → AUSTRIA ANSCHLUSS 1938 | ethnic Russia → Crimea 2014 | "Protect Germans" | "Protect Russians" |
| JAPAN → MANCHURIA 1931 | China → Taiwan threat 2024-25 | False-flag incident Mukden | "Historical province" |
| ITALY → ABYSSINIA 1935 | Israel → annexation rhetoric re: Gaza 2024 | Empire prestige | "Security buffer" |
| USSR → BALTIC STATES 1939-40 | Iran & DPRK → regional missile expansions 2023-25 | Strategic depth | Regime survival |

Figure 1: Summary of Historical Cases and their Moder Parallel

Territorial aggrandisement continues to be justified today with the same narratives of ethnic guardianship or historical rectification that characterised the 1930s. In 1938 Nazi Germany annexed Austria on the pretext of protecting ethnic Germans, an argument echoed in 2014 when the Russian Federation seized Crimea, claiming a duty to defend ethnic Russians inside Ukraine. (Naumov & Senin, 2024) Japan's 1931 takeover of Manchuria was triggered by the Mukden false-flag explosion arranged by officers of the Kwantung Army; similarly, the People's Republic of China cites an allegedly inalienable historical link when it rehearses military scenarios for a potential forced unification with Taiwan. (Chi, 2025; Tan & Tan, 2025) Italy's 1935 invasion of Abyssinia was couched in language of restoring imperial

prestige and creating a security glacis in East Africa. A comparable “security-buffer” logic now underpins Israeli debate about carving out a demolition corridor inside Gaza to impede cross-border attacks; satellite imagery shows more than 30 percent of all buildings within 1 km of the fence have been razed since late 2023. (Wright, 2028; Hassoun, 2025) Finally, the Soviet Union’s 1939-40 absorption of the Baltic states to obtain “strategic depth” foreshadows today’s missile-centric expansionism by Iran and North Korea, which have forward-deployed systems capable of reaching neighbouring capitals to guarantee regime survival. (Tikhonravov, 2025; Khamis, 2023; Shrivastava & Gupta, 2025)

The rhetorical justifications for territorial expansion remain remarkably consistent across eras. Just as Nazi Germany claimed the need to protect ethnic Germans in Austria and the Sudetenland, Russia justified its Crimean annexation as protecting ethnic Russians. China frames Taiwan reunification as reclaiming a historical province, while Chinese military officials employ increasingly hostile rhetoric, describing Taiwan's president as a "parasite". (Atlamazoglou, 2025) These parallels in both method and justification demonstrate how expansionist powers exploit ethnic solidarity and historical claims to legitimize territorial aggression.

2. DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING, EXTREMISM, AND NATIONALISM

European democracy faces unprecedented challenges comparable to the inter-war crisis. More than half of European democracies have experienced erosion in the past five years, with Hungary, Poland, and Serbia registering severe democratic backsliding. (IDEA - International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021) Hungary's regression has continued for fourteen years, while Poland experienced rapid autocratization between 2015 and 2017. (V-Dem Institute, 2025) This erosion follows patterns identified in the 1930s: gradual attacks on constitutional checks and balances, judicial independence, and media pluralism. (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021)

Authoritarian and extremist movements gain legislative traction when mainstream parties appear incapable of solving deep economic or identity-based anxieties, a pattern that mirrors the political upheaval of the 1930s. During the Weimar Republic's crisis summer of July 1932, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) captured 37.3 percent of the vote, earning 230 seats in the Reichstag and becoming the largest party for the first time. This unprecedented electoral breakthrough occurred amid widespread unemployment approaching 30 percent, economic depression, and political violence between Nazi paramilitaries and Communist militants. (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2025; Watson, 2025; Fay, 2015)

The contemporary parallels are striking. Germany's Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), though operating within a democratic system with robust institutional checks, has demonstrated remarkable growth from 11 percent of the European vote in 2019 to 15.9 percent in the 2024 European elections, with its support doubling to 20.8 percent in the February 2025 federal election. This translates into a projected 142 of 630 Bundestag mandates if replicated nationally, representing the party's emergence as Germany's second-strongest political force. The AfD's success has been particularly pronounced in eastern German states, where it exceeded 30 percent in some constituencies and became the first far-right party to win a state election since the Nazi era when it captured 32.8 percent in Thuringia. (The Federal Returning Office, 2024; Schorlemer, 2025) This entire party has been classified by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as a suspected right-wing extremist organization

nationwide, and its regional parties in three federal states as confirmed right-wing extremist organizations. The courts are currently reviewing whether the nationwide classification as confirmed right-wing extremist at the beginning of 2025 is lawful. This classification allows the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to monitor and control the party using intelligence and personal data in order to prevent politically motivated crime and suppress anti-constitutional activities. (Kühling, Springer, & Klein, 2025; Ogorek, 2025)

Italy provides an even more dramatic longitudinal illustration of this trend. While Benito Mussolini held the premiership by the mid-1930s during the original interwar crisis, Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy has experienced meteoric growth from just 4 percent in 2014 to 6.4 percent in the 2019 European elections, then surging to 26 percent in the 2022 national elections, and reaching 28.8 percent in the 2024 European Parliament elections. This trajectory represents more than a quadrupling of support over five years, consolidating her position as head of Italy's most popular party and establishing her as a kingmaker in European politics. (De Giorgi, Cavalieri, & Feo, 2023; European Parliament, 2024)

France's electoral landscape reveals similar dynamics, with Marine Le Pen's National Rally achieving historic gains that demonstrate the normalization of far-right politics across Europe. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the National Rally secured 31.4-31.5 percent of votes, becoming the first French party to exceed 30 percent in European elections since 1984. This represents an eight-point increase from the 23 percent the party achieved in 2019 and more than double President Emmanuel Macron's centrist coalition, which managed only 14.6-15.2 percent. (European Parliament, 2024) The National Rally's success prompted Macron to dissolve the National Assembly and call snap elections, where the party continued its momentum by winning 34.5 percent in the first round of parliamentary voting. (Acharya, 2024)

These electoral successes underscore a broader pattern of far-right normalization across European democracies. The combined vote share of nationalist and far-right parties in France approached 40 percent when including Éric Zemmour's Reconquête party, while Italy's right-wing coalition increased its overall support to 47 percent. Even in Germany, despite the AfD's pariah status among other parties, its growing influence has made coalition formation increasingly difficult and forced mainstream parties into "exotic new coalitions". (Shehzad Ali, 2021)

The contemporary electoral environment mirrors the 1930s crisis in several key respects: economic anxiety, institutional distrust, and the inability of centrist parties to address fundamental social grievances. However, unlike the Weimar Republic, where the NSDAP ultimately gained power through political manoeuvring rather than outright electoral majority, today's far-right parties operate within more resilient democratic frameworks that have so far prevented their accession to executive power despite their electoral gains. Nonetheless, their growing parliamentary representation and influence over policy discourse represents a significant shift in European politics, demonstrating how extremist movements can gain traction through democratic processes when mainstream alternatives fail to address underlying social and economic tensions. (Beramendi, Boix, & Stegmüller, 2025)

Freedom House ratings quantify democratic erosion. No European state was classified "Partly Free" in 1926, yet by 1937 nine fell below that threshold. Today Hungary remains the lone EU member labelled "Partly Free" after its score dropped from 90/100 in 2010 to 65/100 in 2024, reflecting restrictions on

media pluralism and judicial autonomy. (Freedom House, 2025) Even Hungarian President Victor Orbán openly champions “illiberal democracy”. (Kim S. , 2023)

These statistics, shown in Figure 2, confirm a structural linkage: when extremist vote shares climb above the 20-25 percent range and institutional safeguards deteriorate, parliaments struggle to form stable majorities, opening paths to illiberal constitutional change.

| METRIC | INTER-WAR PEAK | 2025 LEVEL | NOTES |
|--|----------------------------------|---|--|
| SHARE OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS HELD BY EXTREMIST NATIONALIST PARTIES IN KEY EUROPEAN STATES | Germany (NSDAP) 37% in July 1932 | Germany (AfD) 20% vote share; 142/630 seats projected | AfD doubled vote share since 2021 |
| COUNTRIES CLASSIFIED AS “PARTLY FREE” OR WORSE IN FREEDOM HOUSE WITHIN EUROPE | 0 (1926 baseline) → 9 (1937) | Hungary downgraded to “Partly Free” 2020 and remains so | Orbán openly champions “illiberal democracy” |
| FAR-RIGHT HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN EU | Italy (Mussolini) by mid-1930s | Italy (Meloni) since 2022 | Coalition sustains nationalist-social conservatism |

Figure 2: Statistics about Far-Right extremist parties

These electoral gains reflect deeper structural problems. Research indicates that democratic backsliding correlates with weak economic performance, low political trust, and high polarization. (Hun, 2025) The average democracy score for Europe has fallen to levels not seen since 1978, representing a forty-year regression when weighted by population. This decline manifests particularly in restrictions on freedom of expression, government and self-censorship of media and civil society, and the gradual co-optation of autonomous democratic actors. (Lindberg, 2018; Cianetti & Hanley, 2021)

3. ECONOMIC STRESSORS AND INTER-GENERATIONAL INEQUALITY

Diminished real wage growth combined with accelerated asset price appreciation constitute primary catalysts of sociopolitical instability and electoral volatility. Historical data from Britain and Germany demonstrate that during the early 1930s deflationary period, youth household earnings declined approximately 25 percent relative to their parental cohorts, reflecting the severe economic disruption that preceded the rise of extremist political movements. (Spread, 2025; Szostak, 2005) Contemporary OECD analysis reveals that the median income for individuals aged 18-29 years exhibits a 13 percent shortfall compared to their parents at equivalent life stages, indicating a persistent pattern of intergenerational economic decline. (ILO - International Labour Organization, 2024; OECD, 2024) Concurrently, the aggregate housing price-to-income index reached 116.2 in 2023 (indexed to 2015 = 100), signifying that real estate valuations have exceeded wage growth by more than 16 percent over the preceding eight-year period. (OECD, 2024; OECD, 2025)

Cross-national polling data from 36 countries reveals that 57 percent of adults anticipate their children will experience inferior financial circumstances compared to their own generation, representing

unprecedented levels of intergenerational pessimism in modern survey archives. (Doroszcyk, 2025) This sentiment reflects particularly acute concern in advanced economies, where over 75 percent of respondents in the United States, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom express pessimism about the next generation's economic prospects. (Killpack, 2025) In the United States specifically, more than one-third of young adults aged 18-24 reported zero wage or salary income in 2022, an increase from 22 percent in 1990, paralleling under-employment patterns last documented during the Great Depression when unemployment reached 24.9 percent by 1933. (Rodgers III, Kassens, & Summers-Gabr, 2024)

Contemporary economic conditions demonstrate structural similarities to inter-war social tensions, particularly regarding housing accessibility and youth economic mobility. Across OECD member states, more than 50 percent of individuals in their twenties continue to reside with their parents, with this proportion reaching 75 percent in Korea, Greece, and Italy. This phenomenon represents a significant increase over the preceding decade and reflects the sustained elevation of real rental costs and property values that have rendered homeownership increasingly inaccessible for young adults. The Institute for Family Studies reports that among young adults under age 35, homeownership rates have declined by nearly 50 percent since the 1970s, while rates among older Americans have remained relatively stable. (Cox & Stone, 2025)

The housing crisis particularly constrains youth employment prospects and wealth accumulation opportunities. Young people demonstrate increased likelihood of engaging in precarious or informal employment while confronting housing costs that consume disproportionate shares of their disposable income. (Chien, Setyowati, Cheng, & Cheng, 2025) Within the European Union, 26 percent of individuals aged 15-29 resided in overcrowded dwellings as of 2019, compared to 17 percent of the general population. (OECD, 2024) Social housing, traditionally providing an affordable alternative for young people, has become increasingly scarce across OECD countries, representing only 7 percent of total housing stock on average, with this proportion decreasing in 18 of 25 OECD countries over the past decade. (OECD, 2024)

These economic pressures contribute to broader patterns of intergenerational pessimism and social discontent. Global survey data indicates that 57 percent of adults expect their children to experience inferior economic outcomes relative to their own generation, a phenomenon that mirrors the economic despair of the 1930s when youth unemployment and housing unaffordability catalysed support for extremist political movements promising radical economic transformation. (Doroszcyk, 2025; Killpack, 2025) The St. Louis Federal Reserve Institute for Economic Equity has identified a concerning correlation between economic disconnection and mental health deterioration among young adults, with depression rates among 18-24 year-olds increasing from under 4 percent in 2017 to over 12 percent in 2022. (Rodgers III, Kassens, & Summers-Gabr, 2024)

The indicators in figure 3 collectively illustrate how stalled social mobility erodes confidence in liberal-democratic bargains: when wage stagnation coincides with asset bubbles, electoral markets reward populists promising radical redistribution or protectionism.

These empirical findings demonstrate that stagnant or declining real wages combined with accelerated asset price inflation create conditions conducive to political volatility by eroding middle-class economic security and intergenerational mobility prospects. The convergence of housing unaffordability, employment precarity, and intergenerational pessimism creates structural tensions

comparable to those that preceded major political upheavals in the twentieth century, suggesting that contemporary democratic institutions face similar challenges in maintaining legitimacy amid sustained economic inequality and social mobility decline.

| INDICATOR | 1930S | 2020S |
|--|---|---|
| YOUTH (18-29) HOUSEHOLD REAL INCOME VS. PARENTAL COHORT | -25% in Germany, U.K. by 1934 (post-Crash data) | -13% median youth income across OECD (2023) |
| HOUSING PRICE-TO-INCOME RATIO INDEX (BASE 2015=100) | Not systematically measured | 116 across OECD (2023) |
| ADULTS EXPECTING CHILDREN TO BE WORSE OFF | No robust polls | 57% global median (2024) |
| YOUNG ADULTS WITH ZERO WAGE INCOME | n/a | >1 in 3 in U.S. (2022) |

Figure 3: Economic Stressors and Inter-Generational Inequality

4. APPEASEMENT, ISOLATIONISM, AND MULTILATERAL EROSION

Contemporary international institutions face funding crises and political paralysis reminiscent of the League of Nations' final years. The United Nations humanitarian system exemplifies this crisis, receiving only 43 percent of its 2024 funding appeal of \$50 billion. By 2025, the situation has deteriorated further, with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs receiving less than 13 percent of its requested \$44 billion, forcing drastic cuts to aid programs worldwide. (OCHA, 2025)

Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, described the situation as requiring "a triage of human survival" due to "brutal funding cuts". The United States, traditionally the largest contributor to UN funding, announced significant cuts to various UN agencies in February 2025, while other donor countries reduced contributions amid global economic uncertainty. This mirrors the League of Nations' experience, where major powers withdrew support and funding, rendering collective security ineffective. (Burke, 2025)

NATO faces similar burden-sharing challenges that echo inter-war alliance problems. Despite the 2014 Défense Investment Pledge establishing a 2 percent of GDP spending target, many allies continue to fall short of this commitment. (Grand, 2023) The alliance's common funding of approximately 4.6 billion euros for 2025 pales in comparison to national contributions, with ongoing debates about whether current spending adequately addresses contemporary security challenges. (NATO, 2025) The persistent questioning of alliance commitments, particularly regarding Article 5 guarantees, undermines collective defence credibility in ways that parallel the League's inability to enforce collective security.

The figure 4 contrasts the fiscal health and security credibility of the 1930s League of Nations with that of today's United Nations and NATO. It highlights how major-power arrears, wavering commitments to collective defence, and chronic humanitarian under-funding have repeatedly weakened multilateral institutions across eras, underscoring persistent structural vulnerabilities that hamper global governance.

| BENCHMARK | | | 1930S LEAGUE OF NATIONS | 2020S UNITED NATIONS / NATO |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|--|---|
| LARGEST MEMBER STATE ARREARS | | | U.S. never joined League | U.S. UNESCO withdrawal |
| TREATY CREDIBILITY | COLLECTIVE-DEFENCE | | Questioned after Manchuria & Abyssinia | U.S. President questions NATO Article 5 if allies under-spend |
| FUNDING HUMANITARIAN NEEDS | SHORTFALL | VS. | n/a | UN OCHA receives only 13% of required \$44 b (2025) |

Figure 4: Appeasement, Isolationism, and Multilateral Erosion

Modern multilateral organizations face funding gaps, burden-sharing quarrels, and credibility deficits reminiscent of the League of Nations’ final years. Mounting U.S. arrears, withdrawals from agencies such as UNESCO, and threats to dilute NATO’s Article 5 reflect waning great-power commitment, while UN humanitarian appeals secure only about 13 percent of requested funds, compelling what officials call a “triage of human survival.” Under-funding erodes operational capacity, diminished capacity discourages further support, and the resulting weakness emboldens revisionist states. Unless major donors restore steady financing and political resolve, the post-1945 security framework may slide toward irrelevance and leave the international order increasingly exposed to coercion and unilateral aggression.

“WHO IS WHO” MAPPING: 1930S ACTORS VS. 2020S COUNTERPARTS

Figure 5 provides a comprehensive framework for understanding contemporary geopolitical dynamics through historical comparison, demonstrating how structural roles in international relations persist across different eras despite changing actors and contexts. This analytical approach clarifies strategic behaviour patterns rather than asserting moral equivalence between past and present actors.

Structural role-matching reveals that Nazi Germany's pursuit of ethnic annexations and revisionist hegemony finds its closest twenty-first-century analogue in the Russian Federation's wars against Ukraine. (Hird, 2024) Russian narratives of ethnic protectionism accompany gradual territorial seizures, mirroring the justifications used by Germany in the 1930s for the Anschluss with Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland. (Kim L. , 2024; Naumov & Senin, 2024) Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea was explicitly justified as protecting ethnic Russians from Ukrainian persecution, while the broader 2022 invasion has been framed in terms of preventing alleged "genocide" against Russian-speaking populations in eastern Ukraine. (Freedman, 2023) This rhetoric directly parallels Nazi claims about protecting ethnic Germans in neighbouring territories.

The inter-war United States, preoccupied with domestic crisis and exhibiting reluctant hegemonic tendencies, bears striking resemblance to contemporary America's oscillation between global leadership and transactional disengagement. (Borg, 2024) Current domestic polarization in the United States has reached levels that significantly affect foreign policy coherence, with isolationist sentiment growing particularly within the Republican Party as Trump and other leaders have criticized U.S. aid to Ukraine and questioned NATO commitments. (Haug, Novoselova, & Klingebiel, 2025) This domestic focus mirrors the American reluctance to engage with international crises during the 1930s, when

economic depression and political divisions limited Washington's willingness to counter rising authoritarian powers.

Imperial Japan's rapid naval modernization and appetite for resource corridors provides a compelling parallel to China's island-building and anti-access strategy across the South and East China Seas. (Chi, 2025; Jash, 2025) China's military preparations regarding Taiwan have intensified dramatically, with the People's Liberation Army escalating military pressure by 300 percent in 2024 alone. U.S. Admiral Samuel Paparo characterized Chinese manoeuvres as "dress rehearsals for forced unification," noting that Beijing's exercises simulate maritime blockades and missile strikes against Taiwan. (Atlamazoglou, 2025) These preparations follow a deliberate three-phase operational plan: joint combat readiness patrols for troop assembly, strikes against sea and land targets to achieve battlefield dominance, and finally manoeuvres to intercept and detain ships bound for Taiwan. (Tiezzi, 2024)

Mid-tier spoilers such as Mussolini's Italy map onto Iran and North Korea, whose missile expansions serve regime-survival doctrines while complicating deterrence in their respective regions. Iran and North Korea have forged a strategic partnership involving extensive cooperation in ballistic missile technology development, with both nations sharing advanced weapons systems and technical expertise. North Korea's deployment of 250 Hwasong-11D launchers near the DMZ and Iran's development of hypersonic missiles and solid-fuel ICBMs demonstrate how mid-tier powers can leverage technological advancement to enhance their regional influence and challenge the established order. (Shrivastava & Gupta, 2025; Solomon, 2017)

The United Kingdom's position as a status-quo but weakened empire finds its contemporary analogue in the European Union, which possesses significant economic weight yet faces limitations in hard-power projection capabilities. (Beaucillon, 2023) The EU has consistently struggled to address crises on its periphery due to its self-image as a normative rather than military power. Despite efforts to develop strategic autonomy through initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund, the EU remains heavily dependent on NATO and U.S. security guarantees. (Michaels & Sus, 2025) The bloc's attempts to build independent military capabilities are hampered by member state reluctance to pool sovereignty in defence matters and the absence of a unified strategic culture. (Biscop, 2022)

Perhaps most critically, the League of Nations' role as an ineffectual security institution parallels the contemporary United Nations' struggles with consensus deadlock and funding collapse. (Richter, Nithammer, & Mândru, 2025; Townsend, 2009) The UN faces a deepening financial crisis that threatens its ability to carry out vital operations worldwide. Member states had paid only \$1.8 billion toward the UN's \$3.7 billion regular budget for 2025 as of May 9, with total unpaid assessments standing at approximately \$2.4 billion. The United States, as the largest debtor owing about \$1.5 billion, has been withholding funds as the Trump administration seeks to cut what it considers unnecessary spending. (OCHA, 2025; Borg, 2024; Burke, 2025; Haug, Novoselova, & Klingebiel, 2025) This funding crisis has forced the UN to implement hiring freezes, scale back services, and reduce humanitarian aid programs, eerily echoing the League's financial difficulties in the 1930s when major powers withdrew support.

The juxtaposition in Figure 5 of 1930s actors with contemporary analogues reveals enduring patterns in international relations: revisionist powers exploit ethnic solidarity and historical grievances to justify territorial expansion; reluctant hegemony struggle with domestic pressures that undermine

international commitments; established powers with limited military capabilities find themselves unable to effectively counter emerging threats; and international institutions suffer from great-power defection and inadequate funding. These structural continuities suggest that while the specific actors and contexts change, the underlying dynamics of power competition, institutional decay, and crisis escalation remain remarkably consistent across historical periods.

Understanding these parallels provides valuable insights for contemporary policymakers and analysts seeking to anticipate future developments and craft appropriate responses to current challenges. The historical precedents demonstrate both the dangers of institutional weakness and great-power competition, as witnessed in the 1930s, and the importance of learning from past failures to strengthen contemporary international arrangements. However, significant differences—particularly nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence—create new constraints and opportunities that distinguish the current era from the interwar period, requiring nuanced analysis that appreciates both continuities and changes in global power dynamics.

| 1930S ACTOR | STRUCTURAL ROLE | 2020S ANALOGUE | RATIONALE |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| NAZI GERMANY | Revisionist great-power in Europe | Russian Federation | Annexations, ethnic claims, authoritarian governance |
| USA (1930S) | Reluctant hegemon, isolationist mood | USA (2020s) | Domestic polarization, Article 5 ambivalence |
| UNITED KINGDOM | Status-quo but weakened empire | European Union | Economic weight yet limited hard-power autonomy |
| IMPERIAL JAPAN | Rising Asian challenger | People’s Republic of China | Regional militarization, resource corridors |
| ITALY (MUSSOLINI) | Mid-tier expansionist satellite | Iran / North Korea | Regional provocations under major-power umbrella |
| LEAGUE OF NATIONS | Ineffectual security institution | United Nations | Consensus deadlock, funding collapse |

Figure 5: Structural Role-Mapping: Historical Parallels and Contemporary Analogues

Discussion: Points of Convergence and Divergence

The comparative analysis between the interwar period of the 1930s and the contemporary post-2014 era reveals both striking structural similarities and crucial differences that fundamentally shape international relations today. This discussion examines three key convergences and three significant divergences that define the contemporary geopolitical landscape.

POINTS OF CONVERGENCE

There are 3 different points of convergence: Revisionist Momentum, Mass-Appeal Nationalism and Institutional Paralysis.

REVISIONIST MOMENTUM: THE RETURN OF TERRITORIAL IRREDENTISM

The first critical convergence lies in the resurgence of territorial revisionism when enforcement mechanisms demonstrate weakness. Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea marked the first forcible alteration of European borders since 1945, directly paralleling the territorial expansionism that characterized the 1930s. This action occurred precisely because international enforcement mechanisms—from the United Nations Security Council to NATO's collective defense guarantees—proved inadequate to prevent or reverse territorial aggression.

The pattern mirrors the League of Nations' inability to respond effectively to Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 or Italy's conquest of Abyssinia in 1935. In both eras, successful territorial revision emboldened further expansionist behavior, creating a cascade effect where initial violations of international law normalize subsequent aggressions. China's increasingly aggressive military preparations regarding Taiwan, involving a 300 percent escalation in military pressure during 2024 alone, exemplifies how demonstrated enforcement weakness encourages revisionist momentum.

Contemporary research confirms this dynamic: states are significantly more likely to attempt territorial revision when they perceive institutional enforcement as weak or inconsistent. The failure of international institutions to impose effective costs on territorial revisionism creates what scholars term "permissive conditions" for further expansionist behavior, replicating the institutional paralysis that preceded World War II.

MASS-APPEAL NATIONALISM: ECONOMIC PRECARITY AND STRONGMAN POLITICS

The second convergence manifests in the relationship between economic precarity and the rise of nationalist strongman politics. Contemporary democratic backsliding follows remarkably similar patterns to the 1930s, where economic hardship created conditions favorable to extremist political mobilization. Recent empirical research demonstrates that income inequality represents one of the strongest predictors of democratic erosion, with unequal societies particularly vulnerable to power-aggrandizing leaders who exploit economic grievances.

The mechanism operates through multiple channels. Economic inequality generates segments of the population who feel excluded from economic development and harbor grievances against elite institutions. These populations become more responsive to populist leaders who promise radical economic transformation while attacking democratic norms. Cultural dilution fears, often expressed through anti-immigration sentiment, amplify these economic anxieties, creating a potent combination that authoritarian leaders exploit.

Contemporary examples include Hungary's Viktor Orbán, who has leveraged economic nationalism and anti-immigration rhetoric to systematically dismantle democratic institutions, and Italy's Giorgia Meloni, whose Brothers of Italy party has quadrupled its vote share by combining economic populism with nationalist appeals. This pattern replicates the 1930s dynamic where economic crisis facilitated the rise of fascist and authoritarian parties across Europe.

INSTITUTIONAL PARALYSIS: GREAT-POWER VETOES AND FUNDING CRISES

The third convergence appears in the systematic weakening of multilateral institutions through great-power disengagement and chronic underfunding. The contemporary United Nations faces financial

paralysis strikingly similar to the League of Nations' final years, with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs receiving only 13 percent of its requested \$44 billion for 2025. This crisis deepened following major powers' funding cuts, particularly from the United States, which owes approximately \$1.5 billion in unpaid assessments.

This institutional paralysis extends beyond financial constraints to fundamental questions of legitimacy and effectiveness. Both the League of Nations and the contemporary UN suffer from great-power vetoes that prevent decisive collective action, while persistent burden-sharing disputes undermine alliance cohesion. NATO faces similar challenges, with ongoing debates about defense spending commitments and the reliability of collective defense guarantees mirroring the alliance problems that plagued European security arrangements in the 1930s.

The pattern reflects what international relations scholars identify as "institutional decay," where multilateral organizations lose effectiveness as major powers pursue increasingly unilateral policies. This creates a feedback loop where institutional weakness encourages further great-power defection, ultimately rendering collective security mechanisms ineffective precisely when they are most needed.

POINTS OF DIVERGENCE

In contrast there are also 3 Points of Divergence: Nuclear Deterrence, Digital Mobilization and Economic Multipolarity.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY IMPACT OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

The most fundamental divergence between the contemporary period and the 1930s lies in the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons on great-power conflict dynamics. Nuclear deterrence fundamentally alters strategic calculations by imposing constraints on escalation that simply did not exist during the interwar period. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) creates what scholars' term "nuclear peace," where the prospect of catastrophic retaliation prevents direct military confrontation between major powers.

This constraint operates even when nuclear powers possess asymmetric arsenals. China's nuclear capability is approximately ten times smaller than that of the United States, yet nuclear deterrence in East Asia remains stable because superiority is not required for effective deterrent effects. The mere possibility of nuclear retaliation inspires restraint, as demonstrated by the fact that over fifty nuclear threats were made in the twenty years following the Cold War, yet none resulted in full-scale war.

Nuclear deterrence also extends to alliance relationships through "extended deterrence," where nuclear powers provide security guarantees to non-nuclear allies. This dynamic creates stability that was absent in the 1930s, when alliance commitments lacked the ultimate deterrent effect of nuclear retaliation. However, this stability comes with its own risks, as nuclear weapons simultaneously make minor conflicts less escalatory while making any escalation potentially civilization-ending.

DIGITAL MOBILIZATION: THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

The second major divergence lies in the unprecedented role of digital communication technologies in political mobilization. Social media platforms fundamentally alter how extremist movements organize, recruit, and spread ideology compared to the radio and print media era of the 1930s. Digital

technologies enable both rapid ideological contagion and counter-mobilization in ways that have no historical precedent.

On one hand, social media accelerates extremist recruitment and radicalization through sophisticated targeting algorithms and echo chambers that reinforce radical ideologies. Extremist groups leverage platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram to create communities, spread propaganda, and coordinate activities across vast geographical distances. The 2024 riots in the UK, sparked by disinformation about an attack in Southport, demonstrate how digital technologies can rapidly escalate local incidents into national unrest.

However, digital technologies also enable unprecedented counter-mobilization and real-time fact-checking that can complicate authoritarian narratives. Democratic movements can organize resistance more effectively than in the pre-digital era, while independent media and citizen journalism can expose authoritarian abuses in real-time. This creates a more complex information environment where authoritarian control is simultaneously easier and harder to maintain than in the 1930s.

The double-edged nature of digital technologies means they can both strengthen and weaken democratic institutions, depending on how they are regulated and used. This ambiguity represents a fundamental difference from the unidirectional media control that characterized 1930s authoritarianism.

ECONOMIC MULTIPOLARITY: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND INTERDEPENDENCE

The third crucial divergence lies in the structure of the global economy, which has evolved from the autarkic bloc economics of the 1930s to today's deeply integrated global value chains. Contemporary economic interdependence creates constraints on aggressive behavior that were largely absent during the interwar period. Modern trade involves complex global production networks where countries depend on inputs from multiple nations, making economic disruption through conflict far more costly than in the 1930s.

This interdependence operates through several mechanisms. Global value chains raise the opportunity costs of conflict by making economic disruption economically damaging for all parties involved. The classical interdependence theory suggests that states with extensive trade relationships are less likely to engage in military conflict because the economic costs of severing those relationships are prohibitive. However, the relationship is complex and conditional, with some research suggesting that extreme interdependence can actually increase conflict risk under certain circumstances.

The emergence of a multipolar global economy further complicates the dynamics of economic conflict. Unlike the bipolar economic competition of the 1930s, contemporary multipolarity creates multiple centers of economic power that can provide alternative partnerships and markets. This reduces the leverage that any single economic power can exercise through sanctions or economic coercion, as demonstrated by Russia's ability to redirect trade flows following Western sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine.

However, economic interdependence has not prevented territorial revisionism entirely, as evidenced by Russia's actions in Ukraine despite significant economic ties with Europe. This suggests that while economic interdependence creates constraints on conflict, it does not eliminate the possibility of territorial aggression when strategic interests are perceived to be at stake.

INTEGRATED ANALYSIS: CONVERGENCES, DIVERGENCES, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The comparative study of the 1930s and the post-2014 international landscape reveals a tapestry of enduring structural parallels intertwined with transformative departures. Three patterns recur across eras—revisionist momentum, mass-appeal nationalism, and institutional paralysis—while three factors decisively differentiate the present day: nuclear deterrence, digital mobilization, and economic multipolarity.

Revisionist states advance territorial irredentism whenever enforcement mechanisms appear feeble, as illustrated by Japan’s seizure of Manchuria and Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia in the 1930s and by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These incursions underscore how permissive international environments embolden expansionist agendas. Economic precarity and perceived cultural dilution further nourish nationalist strongman politics, echoing the path from Weimar instability to Nazi power and resurfacing today in the electoral ascent of parties such as Germany’s AfD, France’s National Rally, and Italy’s Brothers of Italy. Compounding these trends, both the League of Nations and the contemporary United Nations suffer credibility crises driven by great-power vetoes and widening funding gaps, leaving collective security mechanisms increasingly ineffectual.

Yet three modern variables limit direct historical repetition. First, nuclear deterrence imposes a ceiling on great-power escalation; mutual annihilation calculations render total war far less plausible than in the interwar era. Second, digital communication accelerates ideological contagion while simultaneously enabling real-time counter-mobilization—an asymmetry absent from the age of radio and print. Third, dense global value chains raise exit costs for armed conflict, complicating but not eliminating territorial revisionism.

The intersection of these convergences and divergences produces a hybrid strategic environment. Revisionists can still seize territory under the nuclear threshold, exploit social-media ecosystems, and weaponize economic interdependence; however, their freedom of action is narrower than that enjoyed by 1930s aggressors. Meanwhile, democracies confront mass-appeal nationalism amplified by online networks and reinforced by stagnant intergenerational mobility, yet they possess novel tools—digital transparency, rapid sanction coalitions, and nuclear umbrellas—to blunt authoritarian advances.

These dynamics crystallize in four risk vectors—expansionism, democratic backsliding, economic discontent, and multilateral under-funding—each linked to specific early-warning indicators and policy levers. As summarized in figure 6, surpassing quantitative thresholds such as “two or more unrecognized referenda within twenty-four months” or “UN appeals funded below twenty-five percent by the second quarter” should trigger automatic, pre-agreed interventions. Such regimented responses aim to break the feedback loop by which under-funding erodes operational capacity, weakened capacity deters further support, and fading credibility emboldens revisionist actors.

In sum, today’s international order rhymes with—yet does not replicate—the 1930s. Persistent failures to deter incremental aggression, to curb democratic erosion, and to finance global governance echo the League’s slide into irrelevance. Nonetheless, nuclear deterrence, digital agencies, and economic interdependence afford modern policymakers levers that their interwar predecessors lacked.

Harnessing these advantages through automatic sanctions, conditional aid, counter-cyclical social spending, and compulsory multilateral funding could avert a reprise of history’s darkest chapters—provided political will matches analytical foresight.

| RISK VECTOR | INDICATOR | THRESHOLD ALARM | FOR RECOMMENDED INTERVENTION |
|-----------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| EXPANSIONISM | Unrecognized referenda / forced population transfers | 2+ instances in any 24-month window | Automatic G-20 sanctions framework |
| DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING | Freedom House score < 60 & >5-pt decline in 3 yrs | Sustained trend | EU/US conditionality on trade & aid |
| ECONOMIC DISCONTENT | Youth unemployment > 20% AND price-to-income ratio > 120 | 4 consecutive quarters | Counter-cyclical public housing funds |
| MULTILATERAL FUNDING | UN appeal funded < 25% by Q2 | Immediate humanitarian triage | Mandatory donor-GDP levy |

Figure 6: Policy Implications and Early-Warning Indicators

Conclusion

Our cross-domain analysis substantiates the claim that early-twenty-first-century geopolitics exhibits structural echoes of the inter-war period. Expansionist authoritarian states exploit democratic hesitation; extremist movements gain electoral ground amid economic anxieties; and multilateral bodies struggle for relevance when leading powers defect from collective commitments. Yet significant divergences—most notably nuclear deterrence and intricate economic interdependence—temper direct analogy. Recognizing both the rhymes and the differences is essential for crafting policies that avert the catastrophic denouement of the 1930s. Failure to internalise these lessons risks allowing history not merely to rhyme—but to reprise its darkest verses.

The empirical evidence demonstrates that contemporary geopolitics shows striking similarities to the inter-war era across several dimensions: territorial revisionism justified by ethnic and historical claims, democratic erosion through gradual institutional capture, economic stagnation fuelling extremist politics, and the progressive decay of multilateral institutions. These patterns signal systemic stresses comparable to those that presaged global catastrophe in the 1930s. However, the nuclear dimension and today’s dense economic interdependence impose constraints and create opportunities that did not exist eighty years ago. Policies that ignore either the parallels or the divergences risk repeating the miscalculations that crippled the League of Nations and paved the way to war.

The failure of the League to deter Japanese aggression in Manchuria illustrates how international institutions become ineffective when major powers prioritise narrow interests over collective commitments. Contemporary challenges—UN funding gaps and NATO burden-sharing disputes—suggest analogous dynamics at work. Yet the present system still offers scope to reverse course: revitalising multilateral finance, reaffirming collective defence guarantees, and enforcing clear costs for

territorial revisionism can restore deterrent credibility before institutional collapse becomes irreversible.

Understanding these historical parallels while acknowledging present-day differences provides the analytical foundation policymakers need to act with urgency, avoiding both complacency and panic. The 1930s remind us that the gradual erosion of democratic norms, economic stability, and cooperative security can accelerate rapidly toward crisis if left unchecked. Current evidence indicates similar erosion is under way. Historical awareness therefore becomes not merely academic but a practical prerequisite for safeguarding international peace and democratic governance.

LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Data gaps persist, especially regarding real-time metrics on non-state digital propaganda, complicating assessments of information warfare dynamics. Distinguishing causality from correlation remains challenging; recurring patterns must be interpreted cautiously in light of new technological and institutional contexts. Finally, regional variance matters: Latin American and African theatres, though affected by great-power competition, follow trajectories that require distinct modelling. Addressing these limitations through targeted data collection and region-specific studies will sharpen future forecasts and improve the design of preventive policies.

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